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Irrigation water  (including rainfall)  that infiltrates the  subsurface
carries  salts,  pesticide and fertilizer  residues,  and  other  trace
elements,  thus causing a  contamination  of  aquifers  and  soils.  A
similar situation occurs  when  irrigating  with  saline  groundwater
(aquifers containing  saline  water  often  are  found  in  arid  and
semi-arid regions,  where  agricultural production  depends  critically
on groundwater irrigation).  Evaporation  of  the  irrigation  water
increases salt  concentration,  causing  salinization  of  soils  and
aquifers.  Although  not  immediately  noticeable,  these  quality
deterioration processes will have  long-term  effects  and  therefore
require careful management.  The paper describes a general  framework
for  the  intertemporal management of a conjunctive ground and  surface
water  irrigation  system,  taking  into  account  the  quality
deterioration processes.  Policy implications  are discussed  and  the
results are compared with those  that come from a model which neglects
quality effects.
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1.  Introduction
The  conjunctive use of groundwater and surface water  for  irrigation  is
pervasive and has attracted much research,  starting with  the  early  work  of
Burt  (1964a-b) followed by Brown and McGuire  (1967),  Cummings and Burt  (1969),
Burt and Cummings  (1970),  Cummings  and  Winkelman  (1970),  Domenico  et  al.
(1970),  Young and Bredehoeft (1972),  Bredehoeft and Young  [1983],  Tsur  (1990),
and Tsur and Graham-Tomasi  (1990)  among  others.  The  problem,  in  general
terms,  is  that of  allocating  groundwater  over  time  when  the  demand  for
groundwater varies  according to  available supply of surface water.
The  term  "conjunctive ground and surface water system"  is  applied  to  a
number of systems;  they differ according  to  the  ground  and  surface  water
sources.  The  source of surface water  may  consist  solely  of  stream  flows
emanating from  the aquifer,  it may be  independent of  the  groundwater  source
(e.g.,  rainfall)  or it may be  a  combination  of  the  two.  The  groundwater
aquifer may be confined  (see examples  in Margat  and  Saad  [1985]  and  Issar
(1985))  or replenishable,  deep or shallow.  The  surface water  source  may  be
stable or  it  may  stochastically  fluctuate  over  time.  Depending  on  the
particular  situation  one  wishes  to  study,  the  management  problem  of  a
conjunctive ground and surface water system can become quite  involved.
Here we consider a situation in which the  supply  of  surface  water  is
stable and groundwater is  derived from shallow aquifers.  Groundwater  quality
can  affect  yield  directly,  if  groundwater  invades  the  root  zone,  and
indirectly through irrigation.  We  shall focus  attention on the  first,  direct
effect.  This  effect  is controlled via drainage activities.
We describe  a framework for  the management of an irrigation and  drainage2
system, where irrigation  is  derived both from surface and groundwater sources.
We begin,  in Section 2, by  laying out  the  basic  principles  underlying  the
management of a conjunctive ground and surface water system.  After  deriving
the optimal  rules for managing such  a  system  we  argue  that,  due  to  the
open-access  and/or common-property nature  of  groundwater  resources,  market
forces are unlikely to  generate water use patterns which satisfy these  rules.
Possible policies  to  restore  the  optimal management rules are then  discussed.
In Section 3 quality considerations are introduced.  In Section  4  we  derive
the  rules governing desirable irrigation/drainage management  and  extend  the
policy discussion of Section 2 to  that  context.  In Section 5  we  distinguish
between policies  designed to  enforce the  optimal irrigation/drainage rules and
those aimed at  affecting the environment within which the  management  problem
rests.  Some examples  of  the second  type of policy are discussed.
2.  Basic principles of the management of a conjunctive ground and surface
water  system
A conjunctive ground and surface water system consists of a surface water
source  (stream flows,  rainfall,  reservoirs),  a  groundwater  source  (aquifer)
and an agriculture production  process  which  requires  water  as  an  input.
Figure  1 gives a schematic representation of such a system.
I  Figure 1.
Let  F(x)  denote  the water  response  function,  measured  in  dollar  per
hectare  ($/ha),  and x indicate  the  level of water  input,  measured  in  cubic3
meter per hectare  (m3/ha) . The marginal water productivity  is  the  change  in
F(x)  resulting from a  small  (marginal)  change  in  water  input  x  and  is
indicated by F  - 8F/8x.  It  plays a central role  in determining the management
rules.  In most cases  F(x)  increases  in x at a diminishing rate,  thus  F (x) is
X
positive and decreasing in x  (on different ways  to  estimate  this  function  see
Howitt  et al.  (1980) and Paris  and Knapp  (1989)).
The quantities  of surface and groundwater applied for  irrigation at  time
t are denoted by St and gt,  respectively;  total water  input  is  thus xt=  St+gt.
The  amount of  rainfall relevant for  irrigation (during the growing season)  is
assumed stable at  the  level R and  is  included in St,  thus  St > R.  The  stock
on hand of groundwater at  time  t,  denoted  by  Gt,  changes  over  time  as
extraction takes place  and as  some of the water input  (irrigation) infiltrates
the aquifer:
dG /dt  Gt =  -(1-6)g t + 6St (1)
where 6 is  a permeability parameter  indicating  the  fraction  of  the  water
applied for irrigation that permeates  into  the  aquifer  (when  the  aquifer
reaches  its  capacity level,  Gt equals  the minimum between the  right-hand  side
of (1) and zero)
The  cost of pumping groundwater at a rate  g is  given by z(G)g, where  z(G)
is  the unit cost of  groundwater extraction when the  groundwater  stock  is  at
the level G.  z(G)  is  non-increasing  in  G  (a  larger  G  means  a  higher
1F(x)  is derived in the following  manner.  Let  f(x,k)  be  an  agricultural
production function whose arguments are a water  input,  x,  and  a  vector  of
other inputs,  k.  Given the prices of output,  p, and of all  inputs other  than
water,  v, and given the  level of water input, k (x,p,v) represents  the  value
of k that maximizes pf(x,k) - vk.  The water response function  is  given by
F(x) - pf(x,k*(x,p,r))  - r-k*(x,p,r).
where  the fixed prices p and v are  suppress from the notation.4
groundwater  table,  a  shorter  distance  to  the  surface  and  hence  lower
extraction costs).  The unit cost of  surface  water  irrigation  (except  for
rainfall)  is  denoted by w.  The  instantaneous profit generated by St and gt  is
thus given by
F(gt+St )  - z(G)g t - w(St-R).
The amount of  irrigation water may be  subject to capacity constraints.  We  let
C and B indicate  these capacity limits,  thus  gt < C and St  < B for  all t > 0.
A water management policy entails setting St and gt for all  time  periods
t > 0;  it  generates  the benefit  (the present value of the  profit stream)
J  [F(gt+St)  - z(Gt)g  - w(S-R)]e rtdt,
o
where r is  the  time rate of discount.  We seek the  policy that maximizes  this
benefit.
Let V(G)  be  the maximum  feasible  benefit  when  the  current  stock  of
groundwater  is G:
V(G()  =-  z(Gt)g  - w(SC-R)]e  -r  dt
0
subject  to:  Eq.  (1),  0 < gt < C, R <S  <t  B, Gt > 0 and G  = G.  (2)
The  change in V(G) caused by a marginal  (small) change  in G is  the unit  value
of the groundwater stock and is  denoted by V (G).  It  represents  the  future
benefit forgone as  a result  of  pumping  a  unit  groundwater  today  and  is
referred to  as  the shadow price  or  the royalty value of the aquifer.
Using a dynamic programming approach, we obtain for each  time period (see
appendix)  the following relation:
rV(Gt)  - MAX {F(gt+St)  [z(Gt)+V (Gt)(l-6)]g  - [w-V (Gt)6]S  + wR}.  (3)
In words,  the optimal conjunctive ground and surface water policy  (S  t,gt t>0)
is  the one under which the right-hand side of  (3) is maximized  in  each  time
period (subject,  of course,  to  the constraints given in  (2)).  The  object  of
maximization on  the  right-hand  side  of  (3)  is  the  instantaneous  profit5
corrected to  account  for intertemporal effects.  The  intertemporal effects are
effects of current decisions on future profits  and  are  represented  by  the
shadow prices V (Gt).  Thus  the  cost  associated  with  one  cubic  meter  of
groundwater applied for  irrigation today  consists  of  (a)  the  pumping  and
distribution costs as  given by z(G  t),  and (b) the  effect  on  future  profits
resulting from the  drop  in  the  stock  of  groundwater,  which  occurs  due  to
higher pumping costs  in  the  future  and  increased  scarcity  of  groundwater.
This  second cost component is  represented  by  V (Gt)[1-6]  (the  factor  1-6
3  3
accounts  for the  fact  that only  (1-6)  m3 of each 1 m  pumped is  lost,  as  6  m
leaches back into  the  aquifer).  The economic cost of groundwater  is  therefore
given by z(Gt)+VG(Gt)[1-6],  which is  the coefficient of gt on  the  right-hand
side of  (3).  Similarly,  the  economic cost  of  surface  water  is  w-V (G )6, G  t
which consists  of  the engineering cost, w, minus  the  contribution  of  surface
water  to  future profits via its effect on  the groundwater  stock  derived  from
the fraction 6 of the surface water irrigation  that leaches  into the  aquifer.
In view of  (3) the characterization  of  the  optimal  policy  becomes  a
straightforward exercise.  Disregarding for a while  the  capacity limits  (i.e.,
assuming they are not binding)  and without rainfall  (i.e.,  R-O0)  the  following
management  rules apply:
(i)  As  long as  the economic cost of groundwater exceeds that of surface water,
i.e.,  z(Gt)+V (Gt) > w, only surface water  is  used for irrigation at  a  level
that equates the marginal productivity of water  to  its  cost:
F (S  t) -w-  6VG(Gt)
(ii)  As  long as  the economic cost of groundwater falls below that  of  surface
water,  i.e.,  z(G  t)+V (Gt) < w, only groundwater  is used for  irrigation  at  a
level that equates  the marginal productivity of water to  its  cost:
F (g*)  - z(G  )+V (Gt)(l-6).
ii)  When  the  economict  G 
(iii)  When the economic costs of ground and surface  water  are  equal,  i.e.,6
z(Gt)+V (Gt) - w,  irrigation water  is derived from both  sources  at  a  level
that satisfies
F (gt+S)  w  - V(Gt)6
and at  the mix gt/St - 6/(1-S)  such that  the  groundwater stock remains
constant  (Gt - 0).
With the above  interpretation of the economic costs of ground and surface
water,  these  management  rules  make  perfect  intuitive  sense.  Some
modifications,  however, are needed in the presence of binding capacity  limits
and with positive  rainfall;  they are outlined in  the appendix.
The dynamic behavior of the  system  is  depicted in  Figure 2.  At all  stock
levels  G for which z(G)+V (G) lies above w, groundwater  is  more  expensive than
surface water, thus  only the  latter  is  applied for  irrigation (cf.  (i)).  This
causes  the groundwater stock to  increase,  which in turn diminishes  the pumping
cost z(G)  and the  shadow price V (G) of groundwater,  as  represented  by  the
G
declining curve  labeled z(G)+V (G).  When the groundwater  stock  reaches  the
level G, the cost  of groundwater coincides with  that  of  surface  water  and
surface water  is  applied conjunctively with groundwater so  as  to  retain  the
aquifer  at  this  stock  level  (cf.  (iii)).  For  stock  levels  above  G,
groundwater  is  cheaper  than surface water  and  irrigation  water  is  derived
solely from the aquifer  (cf.  (ii)).  This  causes  the  groundwater  stock  to
decline toward G.  The  groundwater stock level G is called  the  steady  state;
the  period in which the  system moves  toward G is called the  transition  period
(stage);  the period in which G - G is  called the  steady period  (stage).
Policy intervention
The management  rules  (i)-(iii) differ  from the myopic rules  under  which
the  instantaneous profit is  maximized in each  time period.  The  myopic  rules
are derived from  (i)-(iii) by setting the  shadow prices V (Gt) equal to  zero.
A question then arises as  to  whether the  individual  growers are  motivated  to7
follow the intertemporal rules  (i)-(iii) or  whether  they  behave  myopically?
Unfortunately,  the second possibility  is more likely to  prevail.  The  problem
is  similar to  that of a "common  property"  situation  (see  Dasgupta  (1982),
Negri  (1989))  in which the  effect  of  each  individual's  extraction  on  the
aquifer  is negligible but  is  not at all negligible with respect to his  or  her
own profits.  Following the  intertemporal rules  entails giving up  some present
profits  in return for future  profits.  But the  future gains  will  materialize
only if all  (or most)  growers follow the  intertemporal  rules.  Now,  if  most
growers  follow  the  intertemporal  rules,  it  is  in  the  interest  of  the
individual  farmer to  behave myopically  because  his  or  her  effect  on  the
aquifer is negligible and he can enjoy larger profits both in the present  and
in the  future.  On the  other hand, if all other growers behave myopically then
the grower should do  the  same,  since otherwise there will be  no  future  gains
to  compensate for  the present  losses.  Realizing that this  line  of  reasoning
is  not exclusive to  any particular individual,  the  grower has  good reasons  to
suspect  that others will not  follow the  intertemporal rules,  in which case  he
should not obey them either  (this  is,  in a nutshell, the  free  rider  problem).
Clearly,  some  regulatory policies  (quota,  taxes)  or  market  mechanism  (water
rights)  to  restore  intertemporal  considerations  are  in  order.  We  shall
briefly discuss the  tax and quota options  (on  water  rights  see  Gisser  and
Sanchez  (1980),  Gisser (1984) and Anderson, Burt  and  Fractor  (1983),  among
others).
Optimal  tax schedule:  The engineering costs  of ground and  surface  water
(z(G)  and  w,  respectively)  do  not  reflect  their  economic  costs
(z(G)+VG(G)[1-S])  and w-V (G)6,  respectively).  A tax schedule  to correct  for
G  G
this discrepancy consists  of taxing each  cubic meter  of  groundwater  by  the
amount V (Gt  )[1-S]  and subsidizing each cubic meter of surface  water  by  the
amount VG(Gt  )6.  The problem with such a tax schedule  is  that  it  depends  on8
the stock of  groundwater and thus  must  be  adjusted  constantly  during  the
transition period.  This might  be  hard  to  administer,  since  it  requires
constantly monitoring the  aquifer level.  Furthermore,  it  is  likely  to  be
objected by farmer who prefer stable water prices.  An alternative  scheme  is
therefore to  impose  the  steady state  tax schedule:  a fixed tax  of  V  G(G)[1-6]
on groundwater and a fixed subsidy of V (G)6 on surface  water.  Such  a  tax
schedule ensures a smooth transition  to  the  steady  state  (though  it  may
lengthen the  transition period relative to  that under the  schedule  described
above),  is  easy  (hence  cheap)  to  administer,  and  is  stable  thereby
facilitating compliance by growers.
Optimal water quotas:  The management rules  (i)-(iii) determine  also  the
desirable quantities  of ground and surface water to be  applied for  irrigation.
During the  transition period,  if  the  aquifer  stock  lies  below  (above)  its
steady state  level G, the optimal policy is  to  prevent  the  use  of  ground
(surface)  water altogether;  as  a result only surface  (ground) water  is  applied
for irrigation and the aquifer  stock increases  (decreases)  until  it  reaches
the steady level G, at which point the quota on ground and  surface  water  is
changed so as  to  retain the  steady state,  as described in  (iii).  The  problem
with this  policy is  that it  entails a discrete jump  in  water  policy  as  the
system moves from the transition period to  the  steady stage,  a jump  that  may
require a change in the agricultural  structure  (e.g.,  crop mix)  of the  region.
Furthermore,  the option of banning the use of a particular source  of water may
simply be  (legally)  impossible.  Such a  policy,  however,  should  be  fairly
simple  to administer and is  ensured to  achieve the desirable water allocation.
A combined tax and quota schedule: A third option to be considered by
water policy-makers  is  that of a combined quota/tax schedule.  Such a policy
consists of setting the prices of ground and surface  water  at  their  steady
levels  z(G)+V (G)[1-6]  and  w-V (G)6,  respectively,  and  at  the  same  time
G  G9
regulating the quantities  of the more  expensive  water  source  in  order  to
expedite  the transition to  the  steady stage.  The  tax part  of such the  policy
ensures smooth transition to  the  steady stage whereas  the quantity  regulation
can be used to  shorten the  undesirably long  transition period associated  with
the  pure tax policy.
Policy implementation
The minimum  information required to  implement a tax policy  contains  the
steady state level  of the  aquifer G and  the  shadow price V (G) at that  level.
G
To obtain this  shadow price one needs to  solve Problem  (2),  along the  line  of
(3),  which requires knowledge of the  water response function F(x)  and  of  the
permeability parameter 6.  A solution of Problem (2) consists  of  the  series  St
and gt  and the associated stock and shadow price processes Gt and V (Gt)  t  >
t.  t  G  t'
0, and is  in principle  attainable  (perhaps only numerically).  While  this  is
fairly easy to  achieve  in the simple case represented by Problem  (2),  it  is
more complicated  in the realistic case described in  the  next  section.  For
such cases  there exist  methods  that  provide  approximates  to  the  optimal
management rules.  Such a method, which approximates the  steady state  solution
by solving a properly defined equivalent static problem, was proposed by  Burt
and Cummings  (1977).
Closing remarks
This  completes our account  of the basic  principles  of  the  conjunctive
management of ground and surface water for irrigation.  Reality,  of course,  is
more complicated than the simple situation considered above.  Thus,  numerous
authors have extended and applied this  framework  to  particular  real  world
situations.  Young and Bredehoeft (1972),  for example,  considered a  situation
in which the only source of surface  water  is  stream  flows  emanating  from
aquifers.  Cummings and Winkelman  (1970),  on the other hand,  analyzed a system
in which surface water  is  independent of groundwater sources.10
Tsur  (1990)  introduced elements of uncertainty to  surface water  supplies
and argued that groundwater,  in addition to  its role of  increasing the  supply
of irrigation water,  serves  also as  a buffer that  mitigates  the  undesirable
fluctuations  in the  water supply.  Tsur  (1990)  calculated the value associated
with the buffer role  (the buffer value) of groundwater for  wheat  growers  in
the Israeli Negev region and  found it  to exceed the  value associated with  the
increase  in the  water supply  (the  latter  is  the benefit that would be obtained
from the  groundwater had surface water supplies  been  stable  at  the  mean).
Tsur's  (1990) analysis  lacks  some  elements of dynamics  since  it considers  the
huge fossil  water aquifer underlying the Negev to  be  effectively  unlimited.
While this  may be justifiable in the particular case of the Negev, it  is  not
so  in general.  Thus,  Tsur  and Graham-Tomasi  (1990)  extended this  framework to
the  case of a finite aquifer.
We proceed now to  incorporate  the  groundwater  quality  effects,  leaving
out  the consideration of the  above  mentioned extensions.
3.  Groundwater quality
The  groundwater quality comes  into effect when two  distinct processes
which affect agricultural yield occur  as  irrigation  water  infiltrates  the
shallow aquifer.  The first is  the  rise in the groundwater  table  toward  the
root  zone  as  the  groundwater  stock  G  increases.  The  second  is  the
deterioration in the quality of the  groundwater  as  salts  and  other  trace
elements are washed into  the  aquifer.  Incorporating quality effects  requires
allowing the water revenue function to  depend also on  the groundwater  stock G,
which represents the groundwater table,  and on a groundwater quality  index  Q,
representing the groundwater salinity level.  We  avoid,  for  the  time  being,
salinity effects via the groundwater  applied  for  irrigation  (For  more  on
salinity control  in groundwater management problems see  Cummings  (1971)  and
Cummings and McFarland  (1974)).  Figure  3 provides a schematic presentation ofsuch a system.
|  Figure 3.|
The water response  function F takes  the  form
F(xt,Gt,Qt).
As  above,  F is  assumed to  increase  in a diminishing rate with the  quantity  of
irrigation water  (F  > 0 and F  < 0).  Both G and Q, on  their  own,  do  not
contribute to yield and may even cause harm  (F  < 0 and F  s 0).  The negative
G  Q
effect of the  one  is  enhanced by an increase  in the  quantity  of  the  other,
i.e.,  their interaction  is  non-positive  (F  < 0).  Thus,  as  the  groundwater
quality  deteriorates  (Q  increases)  the  negative  effect  of  the  ground
waterlogging is magnified  (FG decreases);  likewise,  as  the  groundwater  table
rises  (G increases)  the negative  effect of Q is  exacerbated (F  decreases).
Allowing for  the application of drainage activities,  which involves  tiles
to  remove water to  a drainage canal  (see  Figure  3),  the change  in  the  aquifer
stock is  represented by
dGt/dt - - - S  (1-6)gt - dt ,  (4)
where St,  gt and S  are  as  defined in the  previous section and dt indicates  the
amount of  drainage  (m  /ha).
The  groundwater quality  index  Qt  changes  as  salts  and  other  trace
elements are washed into  the  aquifer by the permeating irrigation water.  This
change, which is  an outcome of  quite complicated hydrological  processes,  may
be represented implicitly as:
dQt/dt - Qt - H(SxtGtQt)
The  larger the amount of permeating water (6x),  the  greater  the quantities  of
salts washed into  the aquifer,  so  that H increases in 6x.  On the other  hand,
we expect that H decreases in Gt (the same amount of salt changes  the salinity
level of a small bucket more than that of a large  one).  For  the  sake  of
concreteness, we  assume that H is  of the  form12
H(6xt,Gt,Qt) - q(Gt,Qt)6x
where the nonnegative function  q(G,Q)  translates  quantities  of  permeating
water  (or of accumulated salts)  into  changes in the  aquifer  salinity  level.
The change  in groundwater quality is  thus  given by
Qt - q(Gt,Qt)6[St+gt] (5)
A water management policy entails setting St,  gt  and  dt for  all  time
periods t  > 0 and generates the  payoff  (the  present  value  of  the  profit
stream):
[F(S+gtGtQ t) z(Gt)gt - mdt - w(St-R)]e  rtdt,
O
where z(G  t),  w and r are  as  defined in  Section 2 and m is  the  unit  cost  of
drainage activities  (m is  fixed and independent  of the  groundwater table).  We
seek the policy that yields  the highest payoff.
4.  Irrigation and drainage management
Let V(G,Q) represent the maximum available payoff when the  current  stock
and quality of  groundwater are G and Q, respectively.  Formally
0 V(GQ)  - MAX  JO[F(S +gtGtQt)  - z(G )gt - mdt  - W(S  -R)]e rtdt
subject  to:  Eqs.  (4)-(5),  O< gt<C, R< St<B, O<  dt  <D,  G = G and Qo= Q,  (6)
where,  as  above,  the parameters  C and B represent  respectively  the  capacity
limits on ground and surface water supplies  and  D  is  a  capacity  limit  on
drainage activities.
The changes  in V(G,Q) associated with a marginal  (small) change in G or Q
(i.e.,  the derivatives of V with respect to  G or Q) are denoted by V (G,Q) and
V (G,Q),  respectively.  These  quantities represent the  unit value of  G  or  Q
and are  thus  referred to  as  the  shadow prices of G or Q.  We expect that V  is
negative  (one would be willing to pay a positive  amount to have Q reduced  and
the groundwater quality improved),  while V  may be positive or  negative.  At
low levels  of G, where the groundwater table  is  well below the  root  zone,  V
G13
will be positive since the  finite  stock of  the  aquifer  entails  a  positive
royalty value  (the forgone benefit of not being able  to use  in  the  future  the
unit of groundwater pumped today).  On the other hand,  at high G levels  where
groundwater has invaded  the root zone,  the damage  to yield  may  outweigh  the
benefit of additional water,  causing V  to become negative.
The Dynamic Programming equation of the present system is  (see  appendix):
rV(Gt,Qt) - MAX  {F(St+gt'GtQt)  [zt+V t- (V  Gt+VQt  q)]g
t'gt'  dt
[w-6(V t+VQtqt)]St  (m+V  t)d t + wR},  (7)
where zt- z(Gt), Vt  V(Gt,Qt), VQt  VQ(Gt,Qt) and  qt-  q(Gt Qt  Analogous
to  the  simpler case  of Section 2, the coefficients of gt,  St  and  dt  on  the
right-hand side of  (6)  represent  the  respective  economic  costs  of  these
activities.  These  costs  consist  of  the  engineering  costs  plus  terms
containing the shadow prices V and V ,  which represent  intertemporal  effects.
We  see  that the  economic  costs  of  ground  and  surface  water  irrigation,
compared to those of Section 2, contain also  the  term -6VQtqt, which  accounts
for the  salinity  effect.  Since V  is  negative  and  qt  is  positive  (see
discussion above)  this  term  is  positive,  implying  that  the  salinization
process  of groundwater increases the  (economic) cost of irrigation.
The  conjunctive ground and surface water management rules  of  Section  2
must be changed to  incorporate effects of salinization of groundwater and  the
drainage  activities.  In view of  (7),  and with no binding capacity  limits  on
irrigation,  it  is  straightforward  to derive  the  following management rules:
(i')  As  long as  the economic cost of groundwater irrigation exceeds  that  of
surface water,  i.e.,  zt+V t > w, irrigation water  is derived only from surface
sources  at a quantity that equates the marginal productivity of water  to  the
economic cost:14
F (St,GQ ) - w  - 6(Vt+V  Qt  )
(ii')  As  long as  the economic cost of  surface water irrigation  exceeds  that
of groundwater,  i.e.,  zt+V t < w, irrigation water  is  derived  only  from  the
aquifer at a quantity that equates  the marginal productivity of water  to  its
economic cost:
F (g,Gt,Q t ) - zt+V t(V  t+V  Qtqt).
(iii')  When the  economic cost of surface  water  irrigation  equals  that  of
groundwater irrigation, i.e.,  zt+V t  w, irrigation  water  is  derived  from
both sources at a quantity that equates  the marginal water productivity  to  the
economic cost:
Fx  (St+g  tGtQt  z  t+ Gt  (  Gt  v  Qtqt
-w  - 5(V  t+Vtqt);
and  the mix of ground and surface water  is  determined so  as  to  preserve  the
2
condition z +Vt  =  w.
(iv)  Drainage  activities are either applied to  a full extent  or  not  applied
at all as m+VGt  is negative or positive,  respectively:
d  D  if  VGt+m <  0
dt '  0  otherwise
2This mix rule  is  self-enforced.  Suppose a non-optimal mix  is  applied  with
too much surface water  (though  the quantity  of  irrigation  water  is  chosen
optimally).  This would increase G above  the level  required to  maintain zt+VGt
- w.  As  a result,  z  t+VGt falls below w so  that water  irrigation  is  derived
only from the aquifer  (Rule  (ii')).  As  a  result,  G  decreases  and  zt+Vst
increases back toward w.  Likewise,  if  the  irrigation  mix  uses  too  much
groundwater,  G reduces and z  t+V t rises  above  w,  which,  in  turn,  prompts
irrigation from surface water only  (Rule  (i')),  causing  G  to  increase  and
zt+V t to diminish back toward w.
t  Gt15
Rules  (i'),  (ii')  and (iii')  are similar in nature  to  their  counterparts
of Section 2.  The  main  difference  is  in  the  levels  of  the  irrigation
activities,  which in the  present case are  influenced also by the  (shadow price
of)  salinity  level of groundwater.  The  forth  rule  concerns  the  drainage
policy.  It states that drainage activities  are applied  only  when  VGt  falls
below -m.
In view of  (iii'),  a steady state  in this problem is  characterized by the
condition z  t+Vt - w, i.e.,  z  t+VGt remains constant:
d[z(G  )+V (Gt Qt)]/dt - z'(Gt)G t + V G  + VGQ  =  0 t  G  t  t  t  t  t  GQt
(z'(G) - dz(G)/dG).  As  long  as  the  salinity  level  Q  affects  V  (see
G
discussion in Section 3),  G will  not remain constant  in the  steady state.  For
suppose  that the mix of  ground and surface water irrigation  is  such that Gt  =
O  [which can be achieved by the mix gt  /S  6/(1-)].  Then,  the  irrigation
water that  leaches into  the aquifer  increases Q which,  in  turn,  reduces  V
Gt
z(Gt)  is unchanged (since Gt is  constant),  thus z  t+V t falls below  w.  As  a
result, groundwater irrigation  is  substituted  for  surface  water  irrigation
(cf.  (ii')),  which causes  Gt to  fall.  A similar argument can be use  to  rule
out  the possibility  that Gt increases.  Thus,  as  long  as  V (G,Q)  decreases
with Q, preserving the equality zt+V t - w requires  that the  groundwater stock
decreases at  the appropriate rate  so as  to counter-balance  the  salinity effect
on V t.  A constant stock level will prevail  in a steady state only when the
groundwater table lies well below the root zone  so  that changes  in  the
salinity level cannot harm yield,  i.e.,  when V  is  independent of Q (V  - 0).
G  GQ
Typically, z(G)+V (G,Q) decreases  in G.  The situation z(G)+V (G,Q)  >  w
is  therefore likely  to  occur at low G levels, where  the  groundwater table  lies
below the root zone.  In such cases,  the economic cost of groundwater  exceeds
that of surface water and groundwater  salinity is not yet harmful;  hence it is
plausible that irrigation utilizes only surface water sources  (cf.  (i')).16
As water permeates  into  the aquifer,  the  groundwater table raises  toward
the root  zone and its  quality deteriorates.  This  causes both  the  extraction
cost,  z(G),  and the  groundwater shadow price V  G(G,Q)  to  fall.  Eventually,  the
equality  z(G)+VG(G,Q) - w holds, extraction begins  and  irrigation  water  is
derived both from the aquifer and  from surface  sources  at just  the  right  mix
so  as  to preserve  the equality z(G)+V (G,Q) - w  (cf.  (iii')).
What happens  if surface water  irrigation is  implemented above  its optimal
level  (say,  because growers behave myopically)?  Then  the  groundwater  table
and salinity continue  to  rise  (as  the  stock  increases  and  its  quality
deteriorates) and Vet diminishes  (both because groundwater is  less  scarce  and
of lesser quality).  As  long as  z  t+VGt < w and VGt  >  -m,  drainage  activities
are not required, but the situation  is  severe  enough  to  warrant  irrigation
with groundwater only and  the  ceasing  of  surface  water  irrigation.  The
situation becomes drastic when the  groundwater stock achieves a level  in which
its  shadow price,  Vt',  falls below  -m;  in such a case  drainage activities  are
in order  (cf.  (iv)).
The  dynamics  of the  system are characterized in Figure 4.  The  level G is
the maximum stock for which groundwater salinity does not  affect  the  shadow
price V  (at stock levels below G, the  groundwater table  is  below  the  root
G
zone and its  salinity cannot affect yield,  i.e.,  V  (G,Q) - 0 for all G <  G).
The  different curves  represent  the  function  z(G)+V (G,Q)  at  different  Q
levels.  They coincide  over the  interval 0 < G <  G (since Q is  irrelevant  in
this  interval),  and for G > G they tilt clockwise as Q increases.  The  curves
abc,  abd and abe correspond respectively to  quality levels Q1,  Q2 and Q3  with
Q1 < Q2  < Q3.  The curve abG corresponds  to  the  maximum  possible  level  of
groundwater salinity.
Suppose  the  initial stock and quality  of  groundwater  are  Gi  and  Q1,
respectively (point a of  Fig.  4).  Since z(Gi)+V (Gl,Ql)  < w, irrigation water17
is  derived solely from the aquifer.  As  a result G decreases, Q increases  and
the  system moves along  the  line  aS  until  it  reaches  the  point  f  where
z(G)+V (G,Q) - w holds.  From there  on the system progresses along  the  line  -Y
toward the point  y (cf.  (iii'))  as Q increases  and G diminishes  at  just  the
appropriate rate so  as  to preserve  the  equality z(G)+V (G,Q) - w.  Eventually
(perhaps after a very long  time),  the  system comes  to a rest at the point 7.
When the  initial groundwater stock is  smaller than G, say at G2  (point  p
of  Fig.  4),  and z(Gz)+V (G2,Q)  > w,  then it pays  to  irrigate  only with surface
water  (cf.  (i')).  As  a result,  G increases  until  it  reaches  the  level  G
(point b of Fig.  4).  At this  stage  it  is  still profitable  to use  only surface
water for  irrigation,  so  that both G and Q increase.  The  system  progresses
along the  line b( until  it reaches point  (, at which stage  z(G)+V (G,Q)  =  w
holds.  From there on the  system progresses along  the  line  7-  toward the point
7 as  Q increases and G is  reduced just at  the appropriate rate  to  retain  the
condition z(G)+V (G,Q) = w.
Policy  intervention
The above management rules  differ from the myopic rules under  which  the
instantaneous profit  is maximized in each  time period.  The myopic  rules  are
obtained by setting the  shadow prices V  and V  equal to  zero.  It  is  clear
from  (iv)  that, as  long as  drainage activities  are costly  (i.e.,  m  >  0),  no
drainage activities  are justified by the myopic rules.  For reasons  discussed
in Section 2, with no policy intervention,  the  individual  growers  are  likely
to behave myopically.  The available policy tools  include  taxes  and/or  quotas
on irrigation water as  well  as  drainage  activities.  The  tax  and  quota
policies  are similar  in nature  to  those discussed  in  Section  2;  they  will
differ  of course  in the magnitudes of  the  taxes or quotas  imposed  (according
to  the difference between Rules  (i)-(iii) and their primed counterparts).  The
drainage  policy  is  unique  to  the  present  case;  its  implementation  is18
characterized in  (iv).
Implementing these policies  requires  knowledge  of  the  shadow  prices
V (G,Q) and V  Q(G,Q),  which can be  obtained by solving Problem (6),  along  the
line of  (7).  The  task of solving  this dynamic programming  problem  may  turn
out to be quite formidable;  approximate solutions,  such  as  the  one proposed by
Burt and Cummings  (1977),  should thus  be considered.
5.  Investment policies
It may be  of interest to  find out how the  irrigation/drainage  management
rules  and the associated benefit change as  some  of the  system parameters,  such
as  the capacity limits  C, B and D, or  the water response function  F(.)  vary.
A policy aimed at changing  these  parameters  is  regarded  as  an  investment
policy. We shall briefly discuss a few such policies which  appear  to  be  of
general  interest.
Extraction and drainage capacities
The  capacity limits  on groundwater extraction,  C, and on drainage,  D, are
important components  in  the  irrigation/drainage management rules.  At the  one
extreme,  no  extraction  or  drainage  facilities  (wells,  pumps,  tiles)  are
installed,  i.e.,  C - D - 0,  so  that  only  surface  water  irrigation  can  be
applied and the region is doomed  to  reach  a  point  where  no  agricultural
production is  feasible.  At the other extreme,  these  capacities are  unlimited
and drainage  activities can be carried out  so  as  to  instantly  reduce  the
groundwater  stock  to  any  desirable  level.  Obviously,  from  the
irrigation/drainage management point of view, unlimited capacity is preferred.
However,  extraction and drainage capacities  entail investment  costs  and  the
benefits associated with unlimited capacities may not justify the  investment.
To  determine the optimal  level of the  extraction and drainage capacities,
let V(G,Q;C,D) be the benefit of an irrigation/drainage policy when the  levels
of groundwater stock and salinity are G and Q, respectively,  and  given  that19
extraction and drainage capacities  are at the  levels  C  and  D,  respectively.
Let  E (C) and Ed(D)  be the investment  costs required to  achieve the  capacities
C and D, respectively  (these technological relations depend,  inter  alia,  on
the hydrology, geology and topography of  the  region).  Then  the  desirable
capacity levels are  those  that maximize V(G,Q;C,D)  - E (C) - Ed(D).
c
Drainage Alternatives
It may be the  case that more  than one drainage alternative  can  be  made
available.  Each drainage alternative entails  operational  costs  (m  in  the
notation of Sections  3 and 4) and the  investment cost of making it  available.
The  latter contains  direct investment  costs  (canals,  tiles,  reservoirs)  and
possibly indirect environmental costs associated with  its operation.
Suppose there are M drainage alternatives with  the unit drainage cost mi,
i-1,2,...,M.  Denote  the  investment  and  environmental  costs  of  the  i'th
drainage  alternative by IDi,  i-1,2,...,M.  Let V(G,Q;mi),  i-l,2,...,M, be  the
benefit of an irrigation/drainage policy when the unit cost of drainage  is  mi..
The desirable choice  of drainage alternative is  the  one  that  generates  the
highest V(G,Q;mi)  - ID..  If a particular  alternative  generates  prohibitive
environmental effects,  then the  associated investment cost  will  be  so  high
that  it will not by selected.
Variety or crop choice
Different  crops,  or  different  variety  of  the  same  crop,  respond
differently to water  salinity.  Those  which  are  more  resistant  will  be
affected to a lesser extent by the saline groundwater.  Changing the  crop  mix
or  the  level of salt resistance of a  particular  crop  entails  changing  the
water response  function F(.)  and thereby the  irrigation/drainage  policy.  In
general,  higher levels of salt resistance require smaller levels  of  drainage
activities and thus  facilitate  the management problem.20
Appendix
A.  Derivation of  the Dynamic Programming equations
In deriving Eq.  (3),  we write
0 V(G)  - MAX  J  [F(gt  +S)  - z(Gd)gt  - w(St-R)]e rt  dt
as
V(G) - MAX  [F(g +S)  - z(G)g  - w(St-R)]e rtdt +
Jt[F(gS)  - z(Gt)gt  - w(S  -R)]e  dt
- MAX  [F(g+S  0) - z(G )g  - w(S  0-R)]r + o(r)  +
MAX  e  'r  [F(gt+St)  - z(Gt)g  - w(St-R)]e  dt}
o
MAX  {[F(go+So)  - (G)g-  w(S -R)]r + o(r)  + e'  rvr)},
where o(r)  is  such that o(r)/r--  0 as  r  - 0.  Writing e rr  _  1 - rr  + o(r)  and
V(G  )  =  V(G) + V (G)Gr + o(r),  collecting terms,  dividing by r, letting r-4 0,
and using Eq.  (2)  yields  Eq.  (3).
Eq.  (7) is  derived in a similar manner using F(g  t+St,Gt,Qt  )  instead of
F(gt+St),  noting that V(Gr,Qr) =  V(G,Q) +  [V (G,Q)G + VQ(G,Q)Q]r  + o(r)  and
using Eqs.  (4) and (5).
B. The management rules of problem (2) in the presence of  capacity limits  and
positive rainfall.
The parameters B, C, and D represent respectively the  capacity limits  on
surface water,  groundwater and drainage;  R denotes  rainfall.
(i)  If z(G  )  + V (G )  > w then:
t  G  t
(a) S  is determined from
F (S)  - w - 6V (G ),
provided a solution St exists such that R <  St <  B;  otherwise St - R or B as
F  (R) <  w  - V  G(Gt)  or F (B) >  w  - V (Gt)6, respectively.
x  G  t  x  G  t21
(b)  gt - 0 if  F (B) s z(Gt)  + VG(Gt)(1-6);  otherwise gt  is  the minimum
between the solution of F (B+g)  - z(G  )  + V (G )(1-6)  and C.
x  t  t  G  t
(ii)  If z(Gt) + V  G(Gt )  < w then:
(a)  gt  is  determined from
F (g  +R) - z(G  )  +  (G )(1-6),
x  t  t  G  t
provided a solution gt exists such that 0 s gt < C;  otherwise gt - 0 or C as
F (R)  < z(G  ) + V (G )(1-6)  or F (C+R) > z(Gt) + V  G(Gt)(1-), respectively.
(b) St - R  (its  lower bound)  if F (C+R) s w - 6V (Gt);  otherwise St is
t  x  G  t
the minimum between the  solution of F (C+S)  - --V  (Gt)  and B.
(iii)  If z(Gt) + V (Gt)  e  w then:
(a) Total  irrigation xt =g  + St  is  determined from
F  (x ) = w - V (G )5,
provided a solution xt exists such  that R s  xt C+B;  otherwise x  R or  C+B
as  F (R)  s w - V (G )6 or F (C+B)  > w - V (G  t),  respectively.
x  G  t  x  G  t
(b) If feasible,  the desirable mix of ground and surface water
satisfies gt/St - 6/(1-6)  such that Gt-  0.22
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Figure  1
Schematic representation of a conjunctive Ground and surface water system.
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Dynamic behavior  of the  solution of  Section 2.
water cost  ($/m  3)
z(G)+V G(G)
G
Groundwater stock  (m  )26
Figure 3.
A conjunctive Ground and surface water system with drainage.
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Figure  4.
Dynamic behavior of the  solution of Section 4.
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